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A Waste of Time: Harmonizing the Comprehensive  
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act  
Under the Lens of Federalism 
 
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014) 
 





Section 9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) gives the federal government 
the power to preempt state law statutes of limitation in certain tort and 
property actions.1 In recent years, § 9658 has become the subject of heated 
debate regarding whether it also extends federal preemption to state law 
statutes of repose.2 This question was addressed in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 
where the United States Supreme Court held that § 9658 does not preempt 
statutes of repose.3  
 
However, this issue has largely escaped scrutiny from a federalist 
perspective.4 Instead, courts have primarily focused on § 9658 as a matter of 
statutory interpretation.5 This is somewhat surprising given that § 9658 has 
the potential to dramatically alter the operation of state tort and property 
law.6 This note analyzes the legal implications of the CTS Corp. decision and 
how it affects important concerns of state sovereignty in the United States’ 





                                                
1 42 U.S.C § 9658(a)(1) (2012). 
2 Jesse Kyle, Waldburger v. CTS Corporation: Ensuring the Plaintiff’s Day in Court As a 
Matter of Principle, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 66, 68 (2014). 
3 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2180 (2014). 
4 Robin Kundis Craig, Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L. REV. 
617, 621 (2012). 
5 Kyle, supra note 2, at 76.  
6 Craig, supra note 4, at 642. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 to combat the increasing danger 
of toxic waste dumping throughout the United States.7 Even though 
CERCLA is specifically aimed at promoting efficient and equitable responses 
to the fallout from hazardous waste,8 courts have criticized its lack of 
precision and clarity.9 CERCLA’s purpose is to “establish a program for 
appropriate environmental response action to protect public health and the 
environment from the dangers posed by [inactive hazardous waste] sites,”10 
as well as to shift the financial burden of waste cleanup to the parties 
responsible for the contamination.11 However, it has been disputed exactly 
how much power CERCLA has over existing state laws addressing the same 
problems.12 Specifically, the question is: to what extent does the federally 
enacted CERCLA preempt state statutes of limitations and repose?13  
 
Although statutes of limitations and repose are both legal instruments 
that limit a cause of action by imposing a time constraint,14 there are several 
key differences.15 While a statute of limitation imposes a time constraint on 
the time before which a plaintiff may bring a cause of action in court, a 
statute of repose limits the time during which a defendant may be found 
liable for a plaintiff’s injuries.16 A limitations period begins to run once a 
                                                
7 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 734 F.3d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 
(2014). 
8 Id.  
9 Id; See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d. 1032, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle Cnty., 851 F.2d. 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988)    
10 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016 (1980).  
11 Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing 
& Coatings, Inc., 473 F. 3d. 824 (7th Cir. 2007)  
12 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014); compare, e.g., Burlington N. & 
S.F.R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2005) and Clark County v. 
Sioux Equipment Corp., 753 N.W. 2d 406, 417 (S.D. 2008) with McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 
548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 
(2014).     
13 Id. 
14 Andrew A. Ferrer, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes of Repose to 
Environmentally-Related Injuries, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 345, 348 (2006). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
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plaintiff’s cause of action accrues.17 On the other hand, a repose period 
begins after the defendant’s last act or omission.18 Even if a plaintiff files an 
action within a limitations period, the claim may still be considered 
extinguished if it is outside the repose period.19  
 
The CERCLA provision in question, § 9658, originated as an 
amendment. It was enacted after a congressional report was commissioned to 
“determine the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in 
providing legal redress for harm . . . caused by the release of hazardous 
substances into the environment.”20 The resulting report proposed certain 
changes to state tort law that would allow tort actions resulting from 
hazardous waste dumping to start accruing after a plaintiff discovers or 
should have reasonably discovered the harm—the “discovery rule”—in order 
to address the type of latent harm unique to environmental injuries.21 
Congress’ reasoning for this recommendation stemmed from the fact that 
injuries caused by hazardous waste dumping often have long latency periods 
of twenty years or more, time during which harm may not be ascertainable to 
the victim.22 Because of this, Congress reasoned, normal state statutes of 
limitations and repose often fully run before a plaintiff becomes aware of his 
or her injury, barring them from recovery.23 
 
After recommending that states change their statutes of limitations 
and repose to reflect this recommendation, Congress instead decided to act at 
the federal level and amend CERCLA to preempt theses state statutes in 
favor of the “discovery” rule in situations where the state limitations period 
begins to run earlier than the federal limitations period.24  
 
                                                
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 349.  
20 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1) (2012).  
21 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 439 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 
(2014); Superfund Section 301(e) Study Grp., 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages from 
Hazardous Wastes--Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, S. Doc. No. 97-571 
(Comm. Print 1982). 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014). 
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However, where the congressional report specifically recommended 
that states change both their statutes of limitations and, the much stricter, 
statutes of repose to include the “discovery rule,” § 9658 only mentions 
statutes of limitations within the actual text.25 As a result, this inconsistency 
has created confusion in that courts, where they are conflicted on how to 
interpret § 9658 and whether it was meant to include both statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose.26  Prior to the CTS Corp. decision,  the 
highest federal courts to discuss this issue were the Fifth27 and Ninth28 
Circuits. 
 
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that § 9658 could not be interpreted to include statutes 
of repose.29 In that case, a Texas railroad sued an owner of chemical storage 
tanks whose tanks ruptured and spilled all over one of the railroad’s right-of-
ways, prompting an expensive cleanup.30 In response, the storage tank owner 
filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer of the tank, alleging 
that the tank had been sold to the owner in a defective condition.31 Because 
the relevant state statute of repose had already run, barring the owner from 
recovering from the manufacturer, the case turned on whether § 9658 of 
CERCLA was created with the purpose of including statutes of repose.32 The 
court reasoned that the plain language of the provision, and “the fundamental 
principle of statutory interpretation—common sense” made it clear that § 
9658 did not include statutes of repose.33 
 
                                                
25 Id. at 2185.  
26 Compare, e.g., Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362 (5th 
Cir. 2005) and Clark County v. Sioux Equipment Corp., 753 N.W. 2d 406, 417 (S.D. 2008) 
with McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. 
v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).     
27 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F. 3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005).  
28 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v. 
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
29 Burlington, 419 F.3d at 362.  
30 Id. at 358.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 361-62.  
33 Id. at 362, 364. 
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In McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.34 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the term 
“statute of limitations” was historically ambiguous and that the provision’s 
legislative history was proof that § 9658 was meant to include statutes of 
repose.35 In that case, property owners sued a mining company for 
negligence, contribution, breach of contract, and fraud in relation to the sale 
of property containing contaminated waste.36 In holding that § 9658 included 
statutes of repose, the court looked to the history of the terms, which it 
decided were used interchangeably at the time of the provision’s enactment, 
creating confusion as to precisely what the term “statute of limitations” 
meant.37 Additionally, the court cited Congressional Report 301(e) as 
evincing Congress’ primary purpose in passing the amendment as a remedy 
for situations in which a plaintiff may lose a cause of action before becoming 
aware of the harm.38 Establishing this purpose, it is only proper that § 9658 
would include statutes of repose as well.39 
 
III. FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
Respondents (“Landowners”) are twenty-five landowners occupying 
land previously owned and used by Petitioner, CTS Corporation (“CTS”), to 
operate an electronics plant.40 While under the ownership of CTS from 1959 
to 1985, the chemicals trichloroethylene (“TCE”) and cis–1, 2–
dichloroethane were stored on the land as part of CTS’ manufacturing and 
disposing of electronics.41 Both of these chemicals have carcinogenic 
effects.42 After the property was sold in 1987, the landowners purchased it in 
the instant action.43 Upon learning from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) that the well water was contaminated with these chemicals 
in 2009, the landowners brought suit in 2011—twenty-four years after CTS 
                                                
34 McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F. 3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated by CTS Corp. v. 
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 777.  
37 Id. at 781.  
38 Id. at 783.  
39 Id. at 779. 
40 CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).  
41 Id. 
42 Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 439 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
43 CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181. 
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sold the property—alleging damages sustained from the chemical storage on 
the land.44 
 
The original suit, filed in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of North Carolina, was a state law nuisance action brought 
against CTS seeking (1) reclamation of “toxic chemicals contaminants” 
belonging to CTS; (2) “remediation of the environmental harm caused by 
these contaminants;” and (3) monetary damages to compensate for the harm 
and losses the landowners suffered because of the chemical storage.45 CTS 
moved to dismiss the claim, citing North Carolina’s statute of repose for real 
property actions, which prevents individuals from bringing a tort claim 
against a defendant more than ten years after the “last act or omission of the 
defendant giving rise to the cause of action.”46 The landowners countered that 
dismissal was improper under § 9658 of CERCLA.47  
 
The trial court granted CTS’s motion, holding that § 9658 did not 
apply, as it only mentions statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose.48 
Because the last culpable act of CTS, the defendant, occurred in 1987 when 
the property was sold, the trial court held that the North Carolina statute of 
repose barred the claim.49 
 
The landowners appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court in favor 
of the landowners.50 The Fourth Circuit reached its decision by finding that 
although the trial court’s reading of the provision was not necessarily wrong, 
§ 9658 was ambiguous at best, and capable of multiple interpretations.51 
Because of this, the court interpreted the meaning that most precisely 
effectuated Congress’ intent when it created the provision.52 To determine 
                                                
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (2014). 
47 Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014). 
48 Id.  
49 CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181.  
50 Id. 
51 Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 441.  
52 Id. at 444. 
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this congressional intent, the court looked “beyond the language of the 
provision to the legislative history for guidance.”53  
 
The Fourth Circuit was unconvinced that the mere omission of the 
term “statute of repose” was dispositive of Congress’ desire to leave such 
situations out of § 9658. In support, the court cited scholars’ and courts’ 
historical tendencies to use the phrases interchangeably.54 Additionally, the 
court found that the trial court’s interpretation of the provision “thwarted 
Congress’ unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from toxic 
wreckage.”55 Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and 
remanded for litigation.56 
 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
decision of the Fourth Circuit, holding that the lower appellate court’s 
interpretation of the provision was both unfounded and against the natural 
interpretation of the text of § 9658.57 In its opinion, the Court held that 
although it was true that there was historical ambiguity concerning the use of 
the term “statute of limitation,” it was unnecessary to reach for these 
interpretations because of the existence of a congressional report, which was 
the basis for the addition of § 9658 in the first place.58  
 
The Court considered the report, which distinguished and discussed 
both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, as clear evidence that 
Congress was aware of the distinction between the terms and chose to leave 
statutes of repose out of § 9658.59 Additionally, the Court held that other key 
features of the provision’s textual language, including singular usage of the 
term “statute” throughout, as apparent applicability to only pre-existing civil 
actions. Tolling is further proof that § 9658 does not cover state statutes of 
repose.60  
 
                                                
53 Id. at 442. 
54 Id. at 443.  
55 Id. at 444.  
56 Id. at 445.  
57 CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2180. 
58 Id. at 2186.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 2186-88.  
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The Court remained unconvinced by the Fourth Circuit’s argument 
that § 9658 should impliedly preempt statutes of repose because of the 
obstacle they pose to the execution of CERCLA’s goals.61 Because of the 
number of other important areas of state law that remain unattended to by 
CERCLA, one more area—statutes of repose—is an unacceptable barrier to 
CERCLA’s goals and purposes.62 Lastly, the Court held that where a 
preemptory interpretation of a federal statute over state law can be avoided, it 
should be for purposes of federalism.63 
 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after being 
originally brought in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of North Carolina and appealing to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit.64 The instant Court reviewed the case to determine whether a 
grant of a motion to dismiss was proper, a decision that hinged on whether § 
9658 of CERCLA was written to preempt state statutes of repose as well as 
statutes of limitations.65  
 
In analyzing this issue, the Court first established that state statutes of 
limitations are clearly preempted by § 9658.66 Section 9658 names statutes of 
limitations as specifically subject to this preemption.67 However, as the Court 
noted, § 9658 does not say anything about state statutes of repose.68 While 
the Fourth Circuit held that statutes of repose could impliedly be read into the 
federal statute,69 the Court was unconvinced for several reasons.70 
 
First, the Court denounced the Fourth Circuit’s decision to interpret 
this statute broadly and liberally, instead of based solely on the provision’s 
                                                
61 Id. at 2188.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 2178. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 2180; see 42 U.S.C § 9658(b)(4)(A) (2012). 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2180. 
70 Id. at 2179.  
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text and structure.71 While the lower court thought that a liberal interpretation 
was appropriate because of the remedial purpose of the federal statute, the 
Court held that this logic was faulty, as almost any statute could be described 
as remedial.72 No legislation, it stated, should be pursued at any cost.73 
 
Next, the Court conceded that omitting the phrase “statute of repose” 
was not dispositive of Congress’ intent to leave it out of § 9658, given the 
informal way that the phrase “statute of limitation” was used in the past.74  
However, the Court noted that the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on historical 
ambiguity of the distinction between statutes of limitation and statutes of 
repose was misguided.75  Instead, the Fourth Circuit should have looked to 
the 1982 congressional study group report, which spurned the creation of § 
9658, for guidance on this issue.76  That report was instructive in interpreting 
the federal statute because, while it does distinguish and discuss both statutes 
of limitation and statutes of repose, the actual statute only discusses statutes 
of limitation.77  Therefore, the Court found that there was a strong argument 
that Congress chose specifically to omit statutes of repose from the federal 
statute.78 
 
Even though this fact alone was not dispositive of an unambiguous 
reading of the provision, the Court went on to note that omitting the phrase 
“statutes of repose,” together with other key textual features of § 9658, made 
it clear that the federal statute was not meant to include statutes of repose.79 
 
 Specifically, the text of the provision includes language describing 
the covered period in the singular, which seems to imply that only statutes of 
limitation, and not both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are 
meant to be included.80  Additionally, the Court noted that § 9658 speaks 
                                                
71 Id. at 2185.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 2186.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 2186-87.  
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only of when “cause of action” may be brought.81 This is important because 
statutes of repose are not related to the accrual of causes of action, but rather 
serve to prohibit actions from commencing.82 Thus, the federal statute 
presupposes that a cause of action already exists, making statutes of 
limitation the only relevant time limits considered in § 9658.83  
 
The last textual feature of the federal statute that the Court found 
controlling was the discussion of equitable tolling for minor or incompetent 
plaintiffs.84  Because a critical distinction between statutes of limitations and 
statutes of repose is the inability of statutes of repose to be delayed by 
estoppel or tolling, the Court found this feature to be an “altogether 
unambiguous textual indication that § 9658 does not preempt statutes of 
repose.”85  
 
While the Fourth Circuit argued that an implied inclusion of statutes 
of repose into the federal statute was necessary to advance CERCLA’s 
purpose and goals, the instant Court disagreed.86  The Fourth Circuit held that 
the purpose of CERCLA was to help plaintiffs bring tort actions for harm 
caused by toxic contaminants and, because statutes of repose create an 
unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment of that goal, the federal statute 
must impliedly preempt them as well.87  However, CERCLA actually does 
not provide a general cause of action for those harmed by toxic contaminants, 
but rather leaves the states’ judgment about causes of action, scope of 
liability, burdens of proof, rules of evidence, and other important rules 
governing civil actions untouched.88  Since CERCLA leaves many areas of 
state law “untouched,” the Court held that the Fourth Circuit failed to show 
why statutes of repose were any different or an “especially egregious” 
omission.89  
                                                
81 Id. at 2187. 
82 Id.   
83 Id.  
84 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(B) (2012)). 
85 Id. at 2187-88 (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1056 (3d ed. 2015)).  
86 Id. at 2188.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
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Lastly, the Court reasoned that in light of the importance to preserve 
states’ powers, where multiple interpretations of a federal statute may be 
plausibly found, the courts will ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors 
federal preemption of state law.90  This approach is “consistent with both 
federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of 
health and safety.”91 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the 




While the immediate impact of the CTS Corp. decision is minimal, 
the potential for large-scale implications remains.93  It is undisputed that 
allowing potential defendants, who would otherwise be liable for tortuously 
creating environmental hazards, to escape liability simply because the 
external manifestation of their harm takes longer to process seems unfair.94  
Additionally, providing potential defendants a loophole to avoid liability 
could incentivize them to plan and execute environmental duties with less 
caution knowing that few, if any, claims will be actionable against them.95  
 
Perhaps realizing these harmful implications, following the Supreme 
Court’s decree that § 9658 did not preempt state statutes of repose, North 
Carolina modified its statute of repose to exempt claims relating to 
groundwater contamination, thereby saving future plaintiffs similarly situated 
to those in CTS Corp. from being barred by the time limitation.96  This, 
coupled with the fact that only four states have enacted generally applicable 
statutes of repose,97 indicates that the CTS Corp. decision has little to no 
                                                
90 Id.  
91 Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  
92 Id. at 2189.  
93 Justin Pidot & Chelsea Thomas, Supreme Court Rules CERCLA Does Not Preempt State 
Statutes of Repose, 46 No. 1 ABA TRENDS 9, 12 (2014).  
94 Andrew A. Ferrer, Note, Excuses, Excuses: The Application of Statutes of Repose to 
Environmentally-Related Injuries, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 345, 371 (2006). 
95 Id. at 372. 
96 Pidot & Thomas, supra note 93, at 12.  
97 Id. at 10.  
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substantial legal implications.  However, some contend that should more 
states choose to adopt statutes of repose, they could easily insulate 
commercial and industrial interests from tort liability, where injuries may not 
be ascertainable for long periods of time, as was the case for the plaintiffs in 
CTS Corp.98  
 
Whether this concern has merit and whether it outweighs important 
policy issues of state sovereignty and federalism is up for debate.99  At the 
very least, there is an implied presumption against federal preemption of state 
law meant to ensure that the delicate balance between federal and state 
authority will not be unnecessarily disturbed.100  This is true especially for 
matters that are traditionally subject to state regulation, such as the 
determination of tort rights and immunities—an area encompassed by 
statutes of repose. 101  Thus, where the text of a preemption clause is 
ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reading, this presumption will 
guide courts to accept the meaning disfavoring preemption.102  
 
Those who believe that § 9658 should be read to include statutes of 
repose point out that an important reason for the presumption against 
preemption is to ward against federal law preempting state law and to bar 
recourse to state liability regimes without placing appropriate federal 
remedies in their place.103  In light of these concerns, proponents for a 
repose-including interpretation argue that including statutes of repose in § 
9658 does not actually detract from state’s legal rights, but instead expands 
them so that plaintiffs may continue to bring substantive state law claims.104  
In doing so, § 9658 does not preempt or change state tort actions, they argue, 
but instead creates national uniformity of commencement dates for tort 
actions within its scope.105  
                                                
98 Id. at 12.  
99 Compare Kyle, supra note 2, at 68 with Craig, supra note 4, at 621 and Adam Bain, 
Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State Statutes of Repose, 43 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 119, 162 (2014).  
100 Bain, supra note 99, at 144.  
101 Id. at 162.  
102 Id. at 146-47.  
103 Kyle, supra note 2, at 92. 
104 Id. at 93.  
105 Id.  
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At first, courts were hesitant to accept the statutes of limitations 
preemption in § 9658 as proper. Now, they seem to have slowly agreed that it 
is not a constitutional overreach.106  For example, a handful of cases have 
addressed whether § 9658 violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring states 
to permit claims that the state law otherwise bars.107  One of the earliest cases 
found support for the proposition that § 9658 was constitutional because the 
Tenth Amendment does not include an affirmative restriction on the 
constitutional authority of Congress to legislate under powers otherwise 
conferred by the Commerce Clause.108  And upon objections that the 
provision exceeded constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause, 
courts have held that § 9658 is an integral part of CERCLA, which itself is 
well-connected to interstate commerce.109  
 
Despite being found constitutional, § 9658 has been consistently 
interpreted very narrowly.110  Originally, it was interpreted as only applying 
to situations in which a state cause of action existed in conjunction with a 
CERCLA cause of action.111  This strict standard of applicability was 
loosened by a Seventh Circuit case, which ruled that although § 9658 terms 
of art cannot be interpreted independently, an accompanying CERCLA claim 
was not necessary for § 9658 to apply.112 
 
 Additionally, courts have been hesitant to extend the federal 
preemption’s reach beyond what is absolutely required by the provision.113  
For example, in 1997, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that § 9658 did 
not apply to workplace exposures to hazardous substances because the 
“release into the environment” requirement of § 9658 did not cover a release 
into the workplace. 114  Furthermore, that court noted that the provision’s 
ability to retroactively revive state law based claims created serious 
                                                
106 Id. at 74.  
107 Id. at 75.  
108 Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 759  F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, (1985)). 
109 Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 202 (2nd Cir. 2007).  
110 Craig, supra note 4, at 637.  
111 Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp 752, 758 (S.D. Ind. 1988).  
112 Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1988).  
113 Craig, supra note 4, at 637.  
114 Becton v. Rhone Poulenc, Inc., 706 So. 2d 1134, 1141 (Ala. 1997).  
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federalism concerns.115  Elsewhere, the Florida Second District Court of 
Appeals ruled that the personal injury language of § 9658 does not 
encompass wrongful death actions.116  This continued resistance seems to 
“create[], at the very least, a perception of federal overreaching into and 
commandeering of state law.”117  Yet, despite this resistance, it is now 
generally accepted that § 9658 does in fact preempt state statutes of 
limitations, and does so constitutionally.118  
 
Somewhat remarkably, only one Supreme Court case explicitly 
addressed CERCLA’s possible federalism implications, while no Supreme 
Court cases have addressed § 9658 specifically.119  This is particularly 
interesting given that the courts have not been shy about addressing such 
concerns in connection with other federal environmental statutes that impose 
liability on land use.120 
 
One potential reason for this disjunction is that these other 
environmental statutes—specifically the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act—directly prohibit certain activities on private 
property, whereas CERCLA is simply a liability scheme (although it may 
impose substantial liability on these activities if they contaminate the 
environment).121 Another reason is that CERCLA provides federal money to 
clean up properties, instead of using state tax dollars.122 Yet another 
explanation is that CERCLA is not perceived as interfering with land use, but 
rather as solving the problem of the increasing, and increasingly costly, 
amount of pollution resulting from the growth of the chemical industry in the 
United States.123 
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 These explanations might explain why CERCLA, as a whole, has 
survived the few constitutional challenges lobbied against it. But, it fails to 
explain why § 9658, which can drastically change the way state tort and 
property law is applied, has been so passively accepted.124  Moreover, some 
argue that § 9658’s imposition on state law may raise serious due process and 
equal protection challenges.125  
 
Therefore, if § 9658’s preemption of state statutes of limitation has 
been so passively accepted as proper under the lens of federalism, why are 
statutes of repose so different?  One of the main reasons the courts seem to 
distinguish between the two limitation periods is because statutes of repose 
deal with substantive rights, whereas statutes of limitation are procedural 
rights.126  Thus, where a claimant’s failure to take some action within a 
statutory limitation period can provide an affirmative defense to a cause of 
action, a claimant’s failure to take some action within a statutory repose 
period will entirely extinguish a cause of action.127  Because statutes of 
repose create a substantive right for putative defendants to be free from 
liability after a certain period of time, they are significantly and legally 
distinguishable from statutes of limitations and deserve separate and unique 
scrutiny.128  
 
This difference, together with the fact that § 9658 does not expressly 
mention preempting statutes of repose, could lead to serious breaches of state 
sovereignty through the creation of state substantive rights if statutes of 
repose are read into this regulation.129  However, a presumption against 
preemption can be sufficiently rebutted if there is evidence of congressional 
intent that runs contrary to the presumption.130  Evidence of congressional 
                                                
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 643; Alfred R. Light, New Federalism, Old Due Process, and Retroactive Revival: 
Constitutional Problems with CERCLA’s Amendment of State Law, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 365 
(1992).  
126 Bain, supra note 98, at 125.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 131-32. 
129 Id. at 146-47.  
130 Id. at 150.  
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 1 
 
89 
intent to include statutes of repose in § 9658 would, at the very least, favor a 
presumption that it does not violate federalist concerns.131 
 
To this end, proponents of a repose-including interpretation point out 
that the language of § 9658 expressly states that the provision is meant to 
preempt state law if “the applicable limitations period for such action (as 
specified in the statute of limitations or under common law) provides a 
commencement date which is earlier than the federally required 
commencement date.”132  Since common law rules of repose exist in certain 
states, the result of allowing states that have these common law rules of 
repose, as opposed to those that are codified in the statutes, to be 
preempted—despite any meaningful distinction between the two—creates an 
illogical and inconsistent reading of § 9658.133  
 
However, this argument inflates the commonality of common law 
rules of repose.  As discussed earlier, while there are only four states with 
generally applicable statutes of repose, Alabama appears to be the only state 
with a generally applicable rule of repose not codified in a statute and still in 
use.134  
 
Moreover, it is likely that any reference to “the common law” in § 
9658 was included to incorporate common law principles that could impact 
the commencement date of the limitations period, taking into consideration 
the fact that some states have judicially interpreted discovery rules.135  This 
interpretation is consistent with another area of CERCLA where “the 
common law” shows up: the savings clause.136  The savings clause provision 
states that “nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liabilities of any person . . . under State law, including 
common law.”137  Thus, under a plain reading of the savings clause, 
CERCLA intends only to affect state procedural rights, while preserving state 
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substantive rights.138  And, as previously discussed, since statutes of repose 
are considered substantive rights, the logical conclusion suggests that only 




CTS Corp. v. Waldenburg definitively represents that § 9658 of 
CERCLA does not include state statutes of repose. This conclusion raises 
some interesting questions about the fundamental differences between 
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, not just from an operational 
standpoint, but also from a federalist perspective.  Although the immediate 
impact of the instant decision seems to be minimal, how it affects important 
principles of federalism and state sovereignty is worth exploring.   
 
While serious concerns with the way CERCLA potentially frees 
tortious defendants from liability remain, that argument is outside the scope 
of § 9658, which is purely a matter of statutory interpretation.  To that end, 
even with minimal evidence of legislative intent, attempting to read this 
provision to include statutes of repose is merely an exercise in wishful 
thinking.  If nothing more, the issue is a divisive one, and when no consensus 
exists on whose interests to serve, or by what means those interests should be 
served, the issue is best left up to the states to decide—especially when that 
issue implicates important substantive rights.139  If North Carolina is any 
indication, states will rise to the occasion. 
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